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Abstract—Phasor measurement units (PMUs) provide high-
fidelity data that improve situation awareness of electric power
grid operations. PMU datastreams inform wide-area state es-
timation, monitor area control error, and facilitate event de-
tection in real time. As PMU data become more available
and increasingly reliable, these devices are found in new roles
within control systems, such as remedial action schemes and
early warning detection systems. As with other cyber physical
systems, maintaining data integrity and security pose a significant
challenge for power system operators. In this paper, we present a
comprehensive analysis of multiple machine learning techniques
to detect malicious data injection within PMU data streams. The
two datasets used in this study come from two PMU networks: an
inter-university, research-grade distribution network spanning
three institutions in the U.S. Pacific Northwest, and a utility trans-
mission network from the Bonneville Power Administration. We
implement the detection algorithms with TensorFlow, an open-
source software library for machine learning, and the results
demonstrate potential for distributing the training workload and
achieving higher performance, while maintaining effectiveness in
the detection of spoofed data.
Index Terms—Smart grid, cyber security, machine learning,
data analytics, phasor measurement unit, PMU, support vector
machine, SVM, artificial neural network, ANN, TensorFlow.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, smart grid technology has become an
emerging and fast-growing field within both research and in-
dustry. The fundamental concept of the smart grid is to enable
and enhance wide-area monitoring, control and protection by
leveraging advances in modern sensing, communication and
information technologies. A core device of the smart grid is
the phasor measurement unit (PMU), invented by Phadke and
Thorp in the 1980s [1]–[3]. These devices provide near real-
time measurements of Steinmetz’s current and voltage phasors,
which represent the real-time status of an electric grid. Mea-
surements from widely-distributed geographical locations are
synchronized with a precise clock using the global positioning
system (GPS), providing each PMU data point with a precise
time stamp aligned to a common time reference [4]. This
time stamp allows PMU data from disparate locations to be
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synchronized, thereby providing a precise and comprehensive
view of the entire grid.
Because of the enhanced monitoring capability enabled by
PMUs, these devices have been widely adopted by electric
utilities, balancing authorities, and transmission operators.
From 2009 to 2014, PMU deployment in the U.S. increased
from 200 PMUs [5] to approximately 1700 [6]. However,
along with the value these devices bring to the power grid,
they also introduce new challenges. The volume of data PMUs
generate presents challenges for the traditional workflow of
grid operations. Specifically, PMU sampling and recording
rates range from 10-60 samples per second [7]. This is much
higher than conventional monitoring technologies such as
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) [8], which
only sample once every two to four seconds. As a result, the
volume of data to be stored, retrieved, processed, and analyzed
is significantly larger than that of conventional systems. For
instance, the Bonneville Power Administration’s PMU network
generates about 1.5 terabytes of data per month. This number
is increasing as new PMUs are added to the system.
Besides the big data challenges, data security and integrity
are also critical concerns. Data integrity can be compromised
due to various causes, such as data drops, clock drifts, or
injection of deceptive data signals. If PMU data are used to
inform power systems operations, these types of deterioration
can affect control operations, ultimately leading to major
problems such as cascading failures.
To address these challenges, research developed within
the fields of big data analytics and machine learning can
be applied to efficiently process and analyze PMU data, as
well as detect any data disruption as it happens. In this
paper, we present our work on evaluating two widely-used
machine learning methods, Support Vector Machines (SVM)
and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), on detecting malicious
data injections in PMU data streams. We use two datasets
containing PMU data collected from real power systems. The
first dataset, BPA Data, comes from PMUs within Bonneville
Power Administration’s 500 kV transmission network.The
second dataset, OSU Data, was collected from the inter-
university PMU network we built with three universities in the
region: Washington State University in Vancouver, Portland
State University, and Oregon State University and contains
data from the distribution level. Using these two datasets, we
conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of
SVM and ANN in detecting spoofed signals within PMU data
streams.
The contributions of this paper are multifold. First, we
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2have identified a set of features derived from historical PMU
measurements, that can be used to reliably train both SVMs
and ANNs to effectively identify spoofs without extensive
parameter turning. Additionally, because our method identifies
spoofs at the phasor data concentrator (using data from mutiple
PMUs) it is immune to attacks that involve physical pene-
tration of substations, individual pmus, or individual private
network links. Second,to the best of our knowledge, this is the
first comprehensive evaluation of multiple machine learning
methods for spoof detection within PMU data streams. Third,
we showed that the performance of training an ANN can
be improved significantly by leveraging the techniques of
distributed computing. This provides potential for future work
in real-time detection of spoofed signals. And lastly, to the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to apply machine
methods to PMU data at both the transmission level and
the distribution level. Our results show that SVM and ANN
are effective for detecting spoofed data within datasets. We
expect these results to demonstrate the value of using machine
learning and data analytics techniques to solve engineering
problems withing the electric power industry.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In
Section II, we present related work in the cyber security aspect
of the power grid, as well as applications of machine learning
methods in this field. Section III introduces the two datasets
used in this study and discusses their characteristics. In Sec-
tion IV, we describe the methodology of our work, specifically
for data processing, feature selection, and evaluation metrics.
Section V presents the evaluation results of both SVM and
ANN, in terms of their performance in both detection, and
training timespan. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper and
presents potential future directions for this work.
II. RELATED WORK
Cyber-security has long been a major concern for critical
infrastructure, defined as assets essential for the functioning
of a complex society [9]. Examples of critical infrastructure
include electric power systems, natural gas and oil pipelines,
and water supply systems. These facilities are monitored and
controlled using Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
(SCADA) systems. SCADA systems collect measurement data
from widely-distributed remote terminal units and issue control
actions to the device-level layers within the infrastructure.
Cyber-security incidents involving energy delivery systems
and associated theoretical attack structures are well docu-
mented [10]–[12]. These attacks, sometimes intelligently de-
signed and executed, are difficult to detect, especially when
disguised via spoofing techniques. For instance, in 2010,
Stuxnet [13]–[15], a computer worm designed to infiltrate
industrial equipment, altered the setpoint speed of centrifuges
drives in an Iranian nuclear facility near Natanz, thereby
causing the centrifuges to malfunction. During attacks, Stuxnet
used spoofed data to mask malicious activities so that opera-
tors were not aware of the setpoint changes. Another example
of using false data to facilitate a cyber attack was the multi-
faceted 2015 disruption of generation facilities in Ukraine [16].
Operators were prevented from sending commands to remote
SCADA devices because the attackers had corrupted those
devices with malicious firmware. This prevented operators
from bringing generation resources back online after the initial
attack. A third example is a series of cyber-attacks reported by
McAfee in 2011 called ‘Night Dragon.’ These attacks targeted
global energy and oil firms, and exfiltrated critical data such
as operational blueprints [17]. These attacks had been ongoing
for more than two years before they were identified because
the attackers used a set of tools to compromise the target
computers and mask their identity.
Recently, with more information and networking technolo-
gies being integrated within smart grids, cyber security con-
cerns in power systems now receive an increasing amount of
attention. Because PMUs are critical data sources [18], [19],
these devices and their communication channels could become
targets of cyber-physical attacks. Most PMUs in service are
limited to providing data that informs intermediate algorithms,
such as state estimation or voltage-stability assessment. The
threat of cyber attack becomes unsettling when the target
PMUs provide data for direct control of a protection system.
For example, the Bonneville Power Administration pioneered
the activation of Remedial Action Schemes (RAS) based on
PMU data [20]–[22]. A cyber attack on these PMUs would
render the RAS inoperable.
As noted previously, PMU data have GPS time stamps. Jian
et al. demonstrate this feature is a potential attack vulnerabil-
ity [23]. Zhang et al. examine the consequences of an attack
on the time stamps of data collected within a smart grid wide-
area network [24]. Shepard et al. surveyed and evaluated the
vulnerabilities of PMUs to GPS spoofing attacks [25]. Ng and
Gao developed strategies to increase robustness of PMU time
estimation [26]. Introduction of PMUs at the distribution level
(aka micro-PMUs) allowed recent studies to identify attacks
by coupling voltage and current data with network traffic data
analysis [27], [28].
Within in the power systems community, PMU data spoof-
ing outside of GPS signal manipulation has received attention
for at least the last ten years. For example, detection of PMU
data manipulation attacks by monitoring the impedances of
transmission lines [29]. It has been shown in [30] that phasor
measurement analysis and state estimation methods can be
combined to detect spoofed data. Real-time detection has also
been addressed [31].
Compared with SCADA systems, PMUs provide sample
data at a much higher rate, normally at 30, 60, or 120
samples per second, as opposed to traditional SCADA refresh
rate of seconds or even minutes. As a result, the amount
of data generated by PMUs is significantly larger than that
of a SCADA-based system. Therefore, big data challenges,
in particular for online applications [32] are inevitably in-
troduced to these systems. To address these challenges, big
data and machine learning techniques may be leveraged and
applied to PMU data storage and processing. A variety of
machine learning techniques have been applied to analyze
PMU data for the purpose of recognizing patterns or signatures
of events. Both classification [33] and clustering [34] are
effective methods in analyzing PMU data streams for event
detection. And, one-class learning has the potential to identify
3anomalies in PMU data [35]. Machine learning techniques
have proven effective at detecting security attacks in cyber-
physical systems, including electric power systems [36]–[38].
However, none of these approaches have been evaluated on
PMU data from a functioning power system.
The majority of prior work examining spoof detection on
PMU signals are similar to ours in that they are designed to
run at a central datacenter with access to multiple sensor/PMU
signals (e.g., [38]–[41]). The benefit of this approach is
that intruders cannot evade detection by injecting their spoof
upstream of the detector. This means that any physical attack
against the substation, its PMUs or the network connecting the
substation to the data center are defended. Further, although
our approach cannot run at the edge of the network (e.g., at
an individual PMU), it is does not need full observations from
all PMUs. Instead, it is designed to run on a small subset
of PMU signals which improves scalability as the number of
PMUs increase and allows the algorithm to run before all PMU
signals have been aggregated.
The work presented here is distinguished in the following
ways. First, spoofs are identified by observing changes in PMU
signal correlation between pairs of PMUs [40]. Magiera and
Katulski used a similar approach for spoof detection, though
focused on Global Navigation Satellite Systems signals instead
of PMU data [42]. Second, to the best of our knowledge,
no previous work has evaluated machine learning methods
using real PMU data streams at both the transmission and
distribution levels. Third, our method explicitly considers, and
avoids, the two limitations from previous work on detecting
PMU spoofs identified above. Finally, we demonstrate the
potential for achieving more efficient training performance
by leveraging a distributed computing framework. This is the
critical initial step to apply these methods to real-time PMU
data streams for online spoof detection, which has not been
addressed in previous literature.
III. DATASETS
Within an electrical grid, PMUs may be deployed at both
the transmission and distribution levels to enhance situational
awareness. These devices, as well as their communications
network, may be targets of a cyber attack. In order to develop
an effective approach for detecting such attacks, it is essential
to evaluate at both the transmission level and the distribution
level. Therefore, we have collected and analyzed PMU data
from both levels for this study; dataset BPA Data came from
a transmission network, while dataset OSU Data came from
a distribution network.
A. Transmission Level Dataset
BPA Data was provided by Bonneville Power Administra-
tion, one of the first transmission operators to implement a
comprehensive adoption of synchrophasors within a wide-area
monitoring system. This dataset contains data collected by ten
PMUs within BPA’s 500 kV PMU network. Note that there
are more PMUs deployed in BPA’s transmission network. We
chose to use ten PMUs for the following reasons. First, based
on historical cyber-security incidents, these attacks usually
have one specific target, either a device or a network channel.
Therefore, to mimic these attacks and evaluate the spoof
detection approaches, using data from a small set of PMUs is
sufficient. Second, being able to detect cyber attacks using only
local information from nearby PMUs is critical. This enables
efficient detection. The same approach can be deployed to
cover the whole system using a divide-and-conquer approach.
The ten PMUs selected for this study are electrically-close
to each other, based on their electrical distance, which has
been shown to be a useful representation of power system
connectivity [43]. Third, selecting 10 PMUs keeps the dataset
at the same scale as our distribution level dataset, for the
purpose of comparison.
B. Distribution Level Dataset
OSU Data comes from seven PMUs from our research-
grade, inter-university PMU network. This dataset provides
PMU data samples from the distribution level. Our research
PMU network consists of seven PMUs, one each at the
Washington State University-Vancouver (WSU-V) and Port-
land State University (PSU) campuses, with the remaining
five placed at multiple locations across the Oregon State
University (OSU) campus. The PMUs provide monitoring at
the utilization level (120/208 V), with the exception of two
PMUs at OSU, which monitor a 4 kV and a 20 kV distribution
substation. All PMUs monitor three phase services.
In our distribution level PMU network, all the PMUs report
data at 60 samples per second to a Phasor Data Concentrator
(PDC) located at the OSU campus. The data management
scheme on the PDC emulates real PDC setups. A local archive
stores 60 days of data on the PDC. The files are archived to
another server for permanent storage.
IV. METHODOLOGY
One lesson learned from major cyber-security incidents,
including Stuxnet and Night Dragon, is that attackers often
mask their malicious activities via spoofing. In other words,
they inject spoofed signals into the system to disguise cyber
attacks. These spoofed signals are designed in a way that the
system cannot easily identify the data as falsified. However,
given that the falsified data is not an accurate measurement of
the system state, there are limits in power systems to how well
a spoof can be disguised. We developed three strategies for
generating spoofed signals. In this section, we present these
strategies, our methods for feature extraction, two machine
learning techniques, and our evaluation metrics.
A. Spoofing Strategies
To describe our spoofing strategies, we use the following
notation. A signal measured at time step k is denoted s(k).
If a spoof begins at time step t, then s(k) = strue(k) for
k < t and s(k) = sspoof (k) for k >= t. That is, prior to t
the measured signal is exactly the true signal, otherwise the
signal is provided by some spoofing method.
Our spoofing strategies aim to prevent easy detection and
are designed in consideration of the following constraints:
4(1) spoofs should provide historically-reasonable values for
the target signals; (2) the onset of a spoof should not create
a discontinuity—that is, a signal, s, sampled immediately
before the spoof, s(t − 1) = strue(t − 1), and at the start
of the spoof, s(t) = sspoof (t), should show a change in
value that is consistent with historical variation of that signal;
(3) spoofed data should only require knowledge of the local
signals, and not, for example, knowledge of signals at other
PMUs. Below, we describe the three strategies employed for
this study for generating sspoof . These strategies all meet the
criteria above and have been explored in prior work (e.g., [41],
[44]): Repeated-Last-Value, Mirroring and Time-Dilation.
The Repeated-Last-Value (RLV) spoof represents the strat-
egy consistent with the constraints outlined above. This spoof
requires knowledge of the true signal values immediately prior
to the spoof onset, and repeats these values for the duration
of the spoof. That is, assuming a spoof begins at time t, the
signal s(t+ i) = sspoof (t+ i) = strue(t− 1) for all i > 0.
The main short-coming of the RLV spoof is that it provides
a constant value signal. Although the signal can clearly be
guaranteed to remain within historic range, and will produce
no discontinuity at the spoof onset, the distribution of values
during the spoofed period will clearly be abnormal.
The Mirroring spoof improves upon the shortcoming of the
RLV. To stage this attack, the adversary records the target
signal for a period of time u prior to the spoof, and then when
the spoof begins at time t, sets s(t + i) = sspoof (t + i) =
strue(t − i) for i = 0 . . . u. However, mirroring imposes
an immediate sign change on the signal’s first derivative
(s(t)−s(t−1) = −s(t+1)+s(t)). Thus, mirroring produces
an inflection point in the signal data when the spoof begins,
violating our second constraint.
The Time-Dilation spoof plays recorded data back at a
slower than normal rate. A time dilation of 2x records data
for n time steps (cycles), but plays these back over 2n cycles.
Like mirroring, time-dilation upholds the three constraints
while providing a historically-reasonable distribution of signal
values. Unlike mirroring, however, time-dilation also improves
continuity of the signals’ first derivative. Time-dilation pre-
serves the sign of the signal’s derivative, but impacts the
derivative’s magnitude proportionally to the amount of dila-
tion. In addition, unlike RLV and Mirroring, which provide
an immediate window for malicious action when the spoof
begins, time-dilation requires that the attacker continues to
monitor, record, and resample live signal data even as the spoof
begins. As a result, the attacker’s window for malicious action
occurs sometime after the spoof has begun, instead of at the
onset.
Figure 1 illustrates the spoof; the true signal is plotted as
a dashed line, the spoof as a solid line. The spoof begins at
cycle 250, illustrated in the plot by the fact that the solid line
begins to diverge from the dashed line at this point. From cycle
250 forward, s(t) = sspoof (t) = strue(250 + (t − 250)/2).
Thus, to perform the spoof, the true signal must be recorded
for some portion of time after the spoof begins. That is, in
this illustration, the true signal has been recorded from cycles
250 through 1125 and that waveform is played back between
cycles 250 and 2000.
It should be noted that for this spoof, and all other spoofs
described above, our focus is on the spoof onset. That is,
we are interested in detecting the spoof as early as possible.
Our spoofs are generated on the last 30 seconds of a one
minute sample and we make no attempt to force the spoof and
the true signal to re-align once the spoof is complete. This
experimental setup strongly favors the spoofer by assuming
that any discontinuity created at the end of the spoof between
the last cycle of the spoofed data and the first cycle of real
signal post-spoof (e.g., in Figure 1 between the spoofed signal
at cycle 2000 and whatever comes next) cannot be detected.
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Fig. 1. 2x dilation spoof
We designed our spoof strategies, e.g., mirror, time dilation
etc., using real PMU data to demonstrate the effectivenss of
our detection algorithm. A spoof that is created using real
high-resolution PMU data is harder to detect. If the attacker
does not have the real PMU data, it is easier for the algorithm
to detect the spoof.
B. Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is a critical step in applying machine
learning techniques to solve a problem. When performing
analysis of complex data, one of the major problems stems
from the number of variables/features involved. Analysis with
a large number of variables generally requires a large amount
of memory and computation power. Also, it may cause a
classification algorithm to overfit to training samples and
generalize poorly to new samples. Feature extraction aims for
constructing combinations of the features while still describing
the data with sufficient accuracy. In our work, one of the main
objectives is to develop a generic set of features from PMU
data that can be used by multiple machine learning algorithms
for detecting spoofed signals.
PMUs measure phasors of line voltages and line currents
for all voltages (A, B, C) and currents (A, B, C, N). From
these are derived a number of other parameters, including
magnitude and phase angle for the positive, negative and
zero sequence voltages and currents; frequency; and, rate of
change of frequency (ROCOF ); among others [7]. In [40], we
describe how intra-PMU parameters (i.e., correlation between
different signals from the same PMU) are usually weakly
correlated, yet the inter-PMU parameters (i.e., the same signal
from different PMUs) are often highly correlated, especially
5when the PMUs are electrically close to each other, as would
be expect from an electrical network featuring a range of
electrical distances between nodes [45]. These observations
indicate that the correlations between PMU signals have great
potential to serve as features to construct the models in
machine learning techniques.
To quantify the degree of correlation between PMU
parameters, we calculate the Pearson Correlation Coeffi-
cient (PCC) between two data streams, X(x1, x2, ..., xn)
and Y (y1, y2, ..., yn). Specifically, given PMUs numbered
1, 2 . . . , p we develop
(
p
2
)
vectors of correlation values be-
tween a specific signal for every pair of PMUs i < j.
This is repeated for eight signals: positive sequence voltage
magnitude |V+|, negative sequence voltage magnitude |V−|,
zero sequence voltage magnitude |V0|, positive sequence phase
angle φ+, negative sequence phase angle φ−, zero sequence
phase angle φ0, frequency f , and ROCOF .
After carefully examining the correlation data for these
eight signals in a previous study, we made the following
observations [40]. First, correlation vectors r(|V+|), r(φ+)
and r(f) are good candidates for detecting spoofing attacks,
as these consistently exhibit moderate to high correlation
values over wide ranges of time. The r(φ+) correlation values
are exceptionally high, near 1.0 under normal circumstances.
Second, ROCOF correlation between PMUs is very poor,
likely due to the fact that it is the second derivative of the
positive sequence phase angle, and hence more susceptible to
noise. Third, correlations on other signals, including r(|V−|),
r(|V0|), r(φ−) and r(φ0), do not exhibit consistent moderate
correlation.
Based on our observations, we chose five correlation fea-
tures to use in the machine learning techniques. These include
the three strongly correlated features, r(|V+|), r(φ+) and r(f),
and two moderately correlated features, r(φ−) and r(φ0).
These features are used in different learning algorithms to
evaluate their effectiveness. Note that these correlation values
fluctuate with time since the correlation is performed using
data windows of a fixed length. In this work, we chose a fixed
window of 5-seconds (300 cycles).
C. Parallel Data Preprocessing
The correlation features derived from the raw PMU data
stream must be computed prior to training and then on a
continuing basis during deployment. As a result, the cost of
extracting features from the raw data has a real impact on
computational resources that need to be continually dedicated
to a tool such as this.
Computing the signal correlations is a parallizeable task,
though the number of correlations that need to be computed
grows quadratically in relation to the number of nearby PMUs.
Thus, the constant factors associated with the preprocessing
are relevant for determining real-world scalability.
We compared the cost of a data preprocessing pipeline built
using two common Python frameworks for parallel/distributed
processing: Celery [46] and ipyparallel [47]. Our results sug-
gest that while inter-process queueing with Celery can add
a significant performance penalty to parallelizing the feature
extraction, the same is not true for ipyparallel.
With ipyparallel, we were able to scale feature extraction
linearly with the number of correlation values and number
of CPUs. Computing the correlations on a sliding 300 cycle
window over 1 minute of data required 1.85 seconds of
CPU time and scaled linearly up to 24 cores at which time
computation became I/O limited on our system. This speed
is well within realtime requirements: 10 PMUs each with 5
signals yields 225 correlations and requires 8 CPU cores to
complete in real-time.
Note that these preprecessing experiments are based on
continuously calculating correlations using a 300-cycle sliding
window with a step of 1 cycle. In reality, the sliding window
can be adjusted by using larger steps, representing a trade off
between the granularity of the correlations and the computa-
tional performance. Also, our previous study shows that for
the spoof detection purposes, it is not necessary to calculate
correlations for all PMU pairs, because a small number of
PMUs that are electrically close to the spoofed PMU will be
enough for the algorithm to trigger the detection. Therefore,
the scalability issues can be addressed for a larger PMU
network.
D. Machine Learning Techniques
Using the correlation features we derived from the raw
PMU data streams, we carried out a comprehensive evaluation
of two widely-used machine learning techniques, Support
Vector Machine (SVM) [48], and Artificial Neural Networks
(ANN) [49].
An SVM is supervised learning model with associated
learning algorithms that analyzes data for classification and
regression analysis. Given a set of training examples, each
marked as belonging to one or the other of two categories,
an SVM training algorithm builds a model that assigns new
examples to one category or the other, making it a non-
probabilistic binary classifier. Specifically, an SVM model is
a representation of the examples as points in space, mapped
so that the examples of the separate categories are divided by
a clear margin that is as wide as possible. New examples are
then mapped into that same space and predicted to belong to a
category based on which side of the margin they fall. Here in
our case, we use the two-class SVM to learn a relationship that
differentiates spoofed PMU signals from the normal signals.
We leverage the Python library sci-kit learn for an SVM
implementation based on libsvm [50], [51].
Similar to the SVM, an ANN is another widely-used tech-
nique for supervised learning. It is a machine learning model
inspired by the biological nervous system. This technique has
been widely applied in the fields of computer vision, speech
recognition, anomaly detection, etc. However, to the best of
our knowledge, it has not been evaluated using power systems
data in the context of spoof detection.
An ANN is based on a collection of connected units
called artificial neurons. Each connection (synapse) between
neurons can transmit a signal to another neuron. The receiving
(postsynaptic) neuron can process the signal and then send it to
the downstream neurons connected to it. Neurons have a state,
generally represented by real numbers, typically between 0
6and 1. Neurons and synapses also have a weight that varies as
learning proceeds, which can increase or decrease the strength
of the signal that it sends downstream. Further, they have an
activation function that determines how the aggregate input
signals trigger an output signal.
Typically, neurons are organized in layers. Layers are made
up of a number of interconnected neurons which contain an
activation function. Data features are presented to the network
via the input layer, which communicates to one or more hidden
layers where the actual processing is done via a system of
weighted connections. The hidden layers then link to an output
layer where the results of the learning are made available to
the users. In our work, we built an ANN which has two hidden
layers, each with 100 neurons.
E. Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate the effectiveness of the two machine learning
techniques on detecting spoofed signals in PMU data, we
carried out a number of experiments and took measurements
on multiple metrics. Below, we describe the performance
metrics we use in this study:
Accuracy: is calculated as the number of correct predic-
tions, i.e., true positives (normal examples identified as such)
plus true negatives (spoofed examples identified as such),
divided by the total number of examples. Accuracy ranges
from 0% to 100% with an ideal classifier measuring 100%.
Sensitivity: measures the ability to correctly detect spoofed
signals, and is calculated as the number of true positives
(spoofed examples identified as such) divided by the number
of total positives (the total number of spoofed examples
which is the sum of true positives and false negatives).
Sensitivity ranges from 0% to 100% with an ideal classifier
measuring 100%.
Precision: measures how many of the positively classified
were relevant and is calculated as the number of true
positives (spoofed examples identified as such) divided by
the number of detected spoofs (false positives plus true
positives). Precision ranges from 0% to 100% with an ideal
classifier measuring 100%.
Specificity: measures the ability to correctly identify normal
signals. It is calculated as the number of true negatives
(normal examples identified as such) divided by the number
of total negatives (the total number of normal examples
which is the sum of true negatives and false positives).
Specificity ranges from 0% to 100% with an ideal classifier
measuring 100%.
F1: measures performance as a single value when classes are
not equally prevalent. It is the harmonic mean of Sensitivity
and Precision. Scores range from 0.0 to 1.0; higher values
are better.
False Discovery Rate (FDR): measures the propensity to
spuriously identify a spoof. This value is calculated as the
number of false positives (normal examples identified as
spoofs) divided by the number of detected spoofs (false posi-
tives plus true positives). False Discovery Rate is equivalent
to (1-Precision). FDR ranges from 0% to 100%; an ideal
classifier has 0% FDR.
Latency: measures how long it takes to identify that a spoof
is occurring. Recall that all the input features are signal
correlation values calculated on a 5-second (300 cycle)
window. Assuming a spoof begins at time t, the correlation
value at time t contains one spoofed value and 299 non-
spoofed values. The correlation value at time t + 299 is
built from a window of entirely spoofed data. Our latency
calculation measures how many cycles must occur before the
classifier begins to consistently identify the spoof (marked
by a contiguous set of thirty positive classifications). Thus,
a latency of 0 indicates that as soon as the correlation
window contains one spoofed data element the classifier will
subsequently detect ≥ 30 consecutive cycles of spoofs.
PMU data can be unreliable, and this lack of reliability can
affect the aforementioned metrics. For instance, a PMU may
go offline, resulting in so-called “data drop,” which appears as
a stream of zero-value data. Other times, a PMU may produce
the same measurements over a continuous period, often termed
“data drift.” When processing PMU data for analysis, data drop
and drift periods need to be removed. Correlation can help.
As demonstrated by Meier et al., both data drop and data drift
are easily identified through rapid decorrelation between the
faulting PMU and near-by PMUs [52].
F. Common Limitations
As noted in Section II, much of the previous work suffers
from practical limitations in that: (1) it models spoof detection
using dc power flow state estimators; and (2) assumes that
the only telemetry signals involved in spoofing/detection are
voltage magnitude and phase angle. Below we describe each
of these limitations in more detail and describe how our
methodology avoids these issues.
First, as noted by Liu and Lie, most research on state
estimation attacks use dc power flow models for H, whereas
utility state estimators use ac models [39]. In essence, this
means that much of the earlier work on spoof detection
makes assumptions that are invalid in practice. Linearized state
estimators neglect reactive power flow, which has a significant
impact on bus voltage magnitudes. Moreover, a state estimator
using an ac H will produce large residues when subjected
to attack vectors derived from a dc H. Our methods do not
depend on a explicit system model H. Instead, an implicit
model is captured by the learning algorithms in the course
of analyzing historical time-series data. In our approach,
correlation of physical phenomena at multiple measurement
points would need to be known in order to construct an
undetectable attack vector. This is a significant hurdle for
attackers. That is, even if the attacker used an accurate and
complete ac H to derive an attack vector, the correlation of
state measurements would still collapse as soon as the false
data are injected into the measurements.
Second, both dc- and ac-based state estimators only use
positive sequence voltage magnitudes and phase angles; no
consideration is given to other data, such as negative and zero
sequence voltages, frequency, or ROCOF , which are also
calculated by PMUs. In contrast, to defeat a classifier built
using the approaches we describe, an attacker would need to
7compromise and correlate all of the PMU data streams, not
just |V+| and φ+. This means that our detection approach,
which works outside of the state-estimation process, should
be less susceptible to spoofing than a system that works as
part of the state-estimation.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Experiments have been carried out using both the BPA and
OSU datasets to evaluate the effectiveness of SVM and ANN
in terms of detecting spoofed signals. In addition, we also
investigated the potential of distributing the training task to
increase the computational performance. In this section, we
present the process of preparing training and testing datasets,
as well as the experimental results.
A. Training and Testing Data
For both the BPA and OSU datasets, we prepare the
training and testing examples as follows. First, we choose
14 independent minutes of normal data from the dataset. We
then apply one of the spoof procedures (Repeated-Last-Value,
Mirroring, and Time-Dilation) to the last 30 seconds of one
selected PMU signal on each of 14 different minutes of data.
Finally, we calculate the pair-wise correlation features, as
described in Section IV-B. For each spoof procedure, this
approach generates roughly 2 · 106 examples from the 14
minutes of data and the 45 PMU pairs (i.e., 10 PMUs) in
the BPA dataset, and roughly 1 · 106 examples from the 14
minutes of data and the 21 PMU pairs (i.e., 7 PMUs) in
the OSU dataset. Examples are “Spoofed” in the last half
of each minute if i is the spoofed PMU, and are “Normal”
otherwise. Given the 14 minutes of data, we use 11 minutes
(roughly 1.6 ·106 examples for BPA data and 8 ·105 examples
for OSU data) for training, and 3 minutes (roughly 4.5 · 105
examples for BPA data and roughly 2.1·105 examples for OSU
data) for testing. During training, all correlations features are
standardized (normalized to 0 mean and standard deviation of
1). The normalization transforms from the training features
are saved so they can later be used to transform testing data
prior to being classified. Note that for the parameter selection
in SVM, we have performed a grid search as follows. We
first split the 11 training minutes into two sets (8 and 3
minutes respectively) and performed a grid search over the
C, γ parameter space by training on the former set and testing
on the later. We observed high performance (F1 > .95) across
a wide range of parameter settings for both datsets. Thus, in
subsequent sections, our results are obtained using the same
set of parameters, C = 1.0, γ = 0.2.
B. Spoof Detection Performance
For each of the spoof procedures, we train a two-class SVM
and an ANN using 11 minutes of data, and then test its detec-
tion performance using the other 3 minutes of data. For each
experiment, we measure the performance metrics described
in Section IV-E. The experimental results for the three spoof
procedures, i.e., RLV, Mirroring, and Time Dilation, are shown
in Table I, II, and III, respectively.
TABLE I
SPOOF DETECTION PERFORMANCE (RLV)
Metrics SVM BPA NN BPA SVM OSU NN OSU
Accuracy 99.90% 99.97% 99.05% 99.26%
Sensitivity 99.13% 99.76% 94.99% 96.16%
Precision 99.96% 100.00% 99.75% 99.74%
Specificity 99.99% 100.00% 99.95% 99.94%
F1 0.995 0.999 0.973 0.979
FDR 0.04% 0.00% 0.25% 0.26%
TABLE II
SPOOF DETECTION PERFORMANCE (MIRRORING)
Metrics SVM BPA NN BPA SVM OSU NN OSU
Accuracy 99.81% 99.93% 98.53% 98.92%
Sensitivity 98.36% 99.36% 92.24% 94.35%
Precision 99.94% 99.99% 99.65% 99.69%
Specificity 99.99% 100.00% 99.93% 99.94%
F1 0.991 0.997 0.958 0.969
FDR 0.06% 0.01% 0.35% 0.31%
For all cases, we achieved high overall accuracy (ranging
from 97.01% to 99.97%) and specificity (ranging from 99.67%
to 100.00%), indicating that both techniques are effective in
correctly identifying normal signals across the transmission
level and distribution level. As for precision and FDR, in
general both methods perform better on the BPA data. This
is likely because the transmission level dataset has less noise
compared to the distribution level dataset.
For all cases, the sensitivity is relatively lower than other
metrics, ranging from 85.00% to 99.76%. This metric mea-
sures the percentage of spoofed signals being correctly iden-
tified by the learning algorithms. This is attributed to the
following two reasons. First, since there is only one PMU
being spoofed, there are more normal examples than the
spoofed ones (3.5-4 times in both datasets). Therefore the
algorithms learn better in terms of identifying normal data.
Second, the calculation of these metrics is based on individual
examples/time points. Each cycle is an example. If a cycle
is within the later 30 seconds of the spoofed minute, it is
labeled as spoofed. However, the features representing this
example are the correlations from a 300-cycle time window
before this time point, which means that some of the spoofed
examples have correlation features composed of mainly non-
spoofed data. This fact may also affect the sensitivity.
The overall performance of both techniques are high on both
datasets, indicating that the features we use are generic across
transmission level and distribution level.
C. ANN Training
A key feature of neural networks is an iterative learning
process in which examples are presented to the network one
at a time, and the weights associated with the input values
are adjusted each time. Typically, this process is repeated for
multiple iterations. In our experiments, we trained the network
over 100 such iterations. However, there is a potential that
the neural network achieves good performance with even less
training time. To this end, we have measured the performance
metrics after each time the network is trained, and the results
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SPOOF DETECTION PERFORMANCE (TIME DILATION)
Metrics SVM BPA NN BPA SVM OSU NN OSU
Accuracy 99.39% 99.73% 97.01% 97.18%
Sensitivity 96.77% 98.71% 85.00% 85.54%
Precision 97.57% 98.84% 98.30% 98.78%
Specificity 99.71% 99.86% 99.67% 99.77%
F1 0.972 0.988 0.912 0.917
FDR 2.43% 1.16% 1.70% 1.22%
are shown in Figure 2. For the larger BPA dataset, our neural
network achieves near optimal performance after being trained
600 times (equivalent to approximately 6 minutes of CPU time
on 1-core), while for the smaller OSU dataset, this number
is decreased to approximately 150 (equivalent to less than
1 minute of CPU time on 1-core). This indicates that for a
system with smaller numbers of PMUs, the neural network
may achieve optimal performance with a much smaller number
of epochs. Regardless, because the classifier is expected to
only require retraining when the system configuration changes
significantly, training can be viewed as an offline process.
(a) BPA Data
(b) OSU Data
Fig. 2. ANN Performance vs. Training Times
D. Spoof Detection Latency
For each of our experiments, we have also measured the
spoof detection latency, i.e., number of cycles after the spoof
begins but before the classifier correctly identifies a string of
30 consecutive cycles as spoofed. This metric represents the
promptness of our spoof detection method, which is critical
in terms of applying this methodology in a real operational
environment.
Specifically, we calculated the minimum and maximum
latency for detecting spoofs in one minute data, for each of
the spoof procedures and datasets. We have also calculated the
“min of the max”, which is the minimum of the max latency
among all sites in each minute (the minimum latency of a
spoof being detected by all sites). The latency results for SVM
and NN are shown in Table IV, and V, respectively.
The experimental results show that the spoof detection
methods works better on BPA data than on the OSU data in
terms of latency. This is expected as the distribution-level OSU
data are noisier than the transmission-level BPA data. Among
the spoof procedures, Time Dilation is the most difficult to
detect, indicated by longer latencies in all cases. The Time
Dilation spoof uses real data to generate spoof signals, which
are very similar to the real signals that a PMU would observe.
TABLE IV
SPOOF DETECTION LATENCY (SVM)
Metrics Min Max Min of Max
OSU mirror 34 135 108
OSU RLV 35 294 64
OSU dilation 27 443 147
BPA mirror 0 80 44
BPA RLV 0 118 6
BPA dilation 0 174 67
TABLE V
SPOOF DETECTION LATENCY (NN)
Metrics Min Max Min of Max
OSU mirror 10 155 115
OSU RLV 12 297 99
OSU dilation 31 518 157
BPA mirror 7 24 19
BPA RLV 2 43 24
BPA dilation 11 64 35
VI. CONCLUSION
With information and communication technologies being
integrated in modern power systems, big data and cyber
security challenges become more pronounced. Historical cyber
attack incidents indicate that spoofing is a common approach
for disguising malicious activities. Spoofed data injected into a
normal data stream make it difficult to identify the underlying
attack. To address the challenges, we applied machine learning
techniques to PMU data for the purpose of detecting spoofs.
Specifically, we developed a generic set of correlation data
based on features from PMU data. We then trained a SVM and
an ANN. To perform a comprehensive evaluation, we used two
datasets, one from BPA’s transmission level 500 kV network,
and the other from our inter-university, distribution level PMU
network. Experimental results showed that both techniques
perform well after being trained using the same set of features.
In addition, the neural network approach demonstrates a good
potential in achieving highly efficient training performance,
via minimizing training iterations, or leveraging distributed
resources.
9Work continues in multiple directions. First, we will ex-
plore classification accuracy and sensitivity (true positive rate)
across a variety of spoofing circumstances. Additionally, we
will explore specificity (true negative rate) across a large, con-
tiguous sample. Second, we will investigate the possibilities
of adjusting the performance of the spoof detection algorithm
based on anticipated threat levels in response to cyber-defense
intelligence. We expect to be able to modify detectability at
the cost of increased computational complexity or increased
false positive rate in response to anticipated events. Third, we
will use principal component analysis to improve learning by
reducing redundant information from the PMU data.
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